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Lopez: RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for Private Litigants

RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for
Private Litigants
INTRODUCTION

At the time of its enactment the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1 was considered by Congress to
be a revolutionary new tool in fighting against organized crime.
RICO provides for criminal and civil sanctions at the instigation of
the Attorney General 2 and private civil actions. 3 Since RICO's creation, the Justice Department has used it extensively, and it has4
proven to be a valuable tool in the fight against organized crime.
Recently RICO, although ignored for a number of years, has been
increasingly used by private litigants. 5 This expansion in use can be
traced to a surge in recent commentary on RICO and the prospect
of obtaining treble damages 6 if successful. However, as of this writing there has been only one reported case in which a plaintiff has
been successful in obtaining treble damages. 7 While a number of
factors have contributed to this result, one stands out. The courts,
seeing this influx of private RICO actions, have become fearful of
the potential for abuse the statute presents. This statute, which was
enacted to fight organized crime, has become a dangerous weapon
against "legitimate" business. 8 In response, the courts have at1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) provides for fines up to $25,000, imprisonment up to
twenty years and forfeiture to the United States of any interest obtained in violation of
RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982) grants the Attorney General the power to instigate
civil proceedings against violators of RICO.
3. 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1982).
4. One recent article notes that the Justice Department has recently placed its
own restrictions on RICO in response to concerns about possible abuse. See Wexler,
Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some MaturationalProblems and Proposalsfor Reform, 35
RUTGERS

L.

REV.

285, 291 (1983).

5. Prior to 1978 there were only two reported cases in which a private civil RICO
action was brought. King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissed for
improper venue), and Barr v. WUI/TAS, 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dismissed for
failure to show defendant's connection to organized crime).
It has been recently noted that since 1978 there have been over one hundred civil
RICO cases reported, with more pending. Siegel, RICO Running Amok in the Board
Rooms, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at 1.
6. Treble damages are damages given by statute in certain cases, consisting of
single damages found by the jury, actually tripled in amount. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1347 (5th ed. 1979).
7. The court in B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J.
1983), did grant the plaintiff a treble damages recovery but this judgment was later
vacated by the circuit court. See B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., No. 84-5087 (3d
Cir. 1984) copy on file in the offices of California Western Law Review.
8. Recent RICO litigation has involved such companies as Rockwell International
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tempted to limit private RICO causes of action by placing various
limitations on its use. 9 Some of these limitations may be viewed as
valid and others may not. Among the limitations that have been
implemented is the denial of any form of equitable relief' 0 to private
litigants.
The denial or granting of equitable relief to RICO plaintiffs could
have a tremendous impact on its use. If RICO is read as granting
equitable remedies to private litigants under section 1964(a)," it
would become possible for private litigants to seek divestiture,12 dissolution' 3 or reorganization 14 of many enterprises. Considering
RICO's potential for improper use, this could be a dangerous result.15 This Comment will examine the issue whether Congress intended for the court to grant such drastic remedies to private
litigants. The conclusion is that RICO as it stands today should not
be the source of equitable relief to private litigants. Such a conclusion will be reached first, by examining recent court holdings either
denying or granting equitable relief to private litigants. Second, this
Comment will examine the language of the RICO statute itself and
its legislative history in relation to the denial or granting of equitable relief to private litigants. Third, it will compare RICO to similar antitrust legislation. Finally, this Comment will discuss whether
the right to equitable relief may be implied through the court's inherent equitable power.

I. A RICO

CAUSE OF ACTION

To plead a RICO cause of action, a plaintiff must establish that a
person 16 has committed two or more predicate acts.' 7 The commisCorp., IBM, Hitachi Ltd., Shearson/American Express, Chase Manhatten Bank,
Lloyds of London and E.F. Hutton. Siegel, RICO Running Amok in Board Rooms,
L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at 1.
9. See infra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
10. Equitable relief is that form of relief granted by a court with equity powers as,
for example, in the case of one seeking injunctive relief. Ordinarily a plaintiff, to obtain
equitable relief, must establish his remedy at law is inadequate (money damages would
not fully compensate the loss). This requirement often makes equitable relief more difficult to obtain. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
12. Black's defines "divestiture" as an "order of the court to a defendant to divest
himself of property or other assets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 429 (5th ed. 1979).
13. Black's defines "dissolution" as "the act or process of dissolving; termination;
winding up." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (5th ed. 1979).
14. Black's defines "reorganization" as "a major change in the capital structure of
a corporation that leads to changes in the right, interests and implied ownership of the
various security owners." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1167 (5th ed. 1979).
15. While the legislative history of RICO does indicate that Congress recognized
that RICO could be used against legitimate business, the primary purpose of RICO is
eradication of organized crime. See infra note 115.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) provides: "'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. .. "
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sion of these predicate acts must constitute a pattern 18 of racketeer-

ing activity. 19 A plaintiff must also establish that through this
activity the defendant directly or indirectly maintained an interest
in or participated in20 an enterprise. 2 1 Finally, the plaintiff must
17. Predicate acts include those acts defined as "racketeering activity" in 18 U.S.C
§ 1961(1) (1982). See infra note 19.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides that a "'pattern of racketeering activity'
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. .."
The majority of courts as of this time agree that a pattern of racketeering activity is
shown by establishing that at least two racketeering acts have been committed in furtherance of a single scheme. Clute v. Davenport Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D.
Conn. 1984) (pattern shown by two acts of securities fraud); In re Action Industries
Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D. Va. 1983). But see Teleprompter of Erie Inc.
v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (to establish a pattern the plaintiff
must establish more than two acts of bribery; he must establish more than one unlawful
scheme.)
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides:
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section
501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title II, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States ....
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for pur-
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establish that the activities of the enterprise affect interstate commerce. 22 Even if a plaintiff is able to overcome the burden of establishing a substantive violation of RICO, 23 the issue of relief,
equitable or compensatory, is still subject to other court created
limitations. These limitations include the requirement that the defendant have a connection with organized crime. 24 This limitation
poses of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating
in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchase, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 provides: "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."
The question whether an enterprise has been shown has been a problem. A number
of courts have held that the person cannot also be the enterprise. Rae v. Union Bank,
725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984) (the enterprise must be distinct from the person);
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982); Saine v. AIA, Inc., 582 F. Supp.
1299, 1306 (D. Colo. 1984); In re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849
(E.D. Va. 1983); Bays v. Hunter Savings & Loan Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D.
Ohio 1982). But see United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp.
279, 329 (D.N.J. 1984) (person may also be the enterprise).
Also at issue is whether or not the pattern of racketeering activity can also be the
enterprise as an association in fact. The Supreme Court may have answered the question in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (the enterprise is not the
pattern of racketeering activity). See also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th
Cir. 1982); Saine v. AIA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (D. Colo. 1984) (the enterprise
must have an existence separate and distinct from the pattern which it is engaged);
Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (the enterprise must have
an ascertainable and distinct function from the racketeering activity).
But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984) (the enterprise need not have any economic significance from the pattern of racketeering activity).
22. This requirement is satisfied if any function or act of the enterprise affects interstate commerce, including the racketeering acts of the enterprise. Bunker Ramo
Corp. v. United Business Forms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1289 (7th Cir. 1983).
23. The burden of proof in a civil RICO action is a preponderance of the evidence.
Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280
(D. Del. 1978). The same burden of proof also applies in civil actions brought by the
government. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Local 560, In'tl Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984).
24. Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983);

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss2/9

4

1985]

Lopez: RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for Private Litigants
RICO AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES

may be traced to RICO's statement of purpose,2 5 which if read
alone supports such a limit. However, most courts have rejected
this restriction as contrary to the legislative history of RICO.2 6 Another limitation is the requirement that the defendant be convicted
of the commission of at least two predicate acts in a criminal proceeding before a private action may be brought. While such a requirement has also been rejected by most courts 2 7 the Second
Circuit recently chose to adopt such a limitation in all private civil
RICO actions. 28
Finally, the most prevalent limitation on private civil RICO
causes of action is the requirement that the plaintiff establish he has
incurred the requisite type of injury. This standing 29 requirement
arises out of the language of section 1964(c) 30 and the similarly
worded section 4 of the Clayton Act. 3 1 Some courts have directly
applied antitrust concepts to RICO, by requiring that the injury to
the plaintiff be in the nature of a commercial or competitive injury.32 Some courts characterize the requisite injury as a racketeerWaterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D.
La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Barr v. WUI/TAS 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. See infra note 115.
26. Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractors, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5,
21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984);
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509
(1983); Wilkox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1984); In re Catanella
& E.F. Hutton Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1428 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Swanson v. Wabash,
Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1983); B.F. Hirsh, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co.,
577 F. Supp. 339, 348 (D.N.J. 1983); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp.
846, 850 (E.D. Va. 1983); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
27. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Canton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Heinold
Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank of
the State of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
28. Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 496, (2d Cir. 1984). cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) No. 84-684.
29. "Standing to sue means that the party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise
justifiable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. It is a concept
utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to ensure that a justifiable
controversy is presented to the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (5th ed. 1979).

30. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
32. Bankers Trust v. Feldsman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affrd,
722 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must show he has been competitively injured);
Van Shaick v. Church of Scientology of Ca., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass
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ing enterprise injury. 3 3 Other courts have required that the plaintiff
be injured by reason of a violation of section 1962. 34 These standing

limitations improperly apply antitrust concepts to RICO. 35 Moreover, these limitations deny recovery to plaintiffs directly injured 36
by the commission of the predicate acts. Recognizing this, a
number of courts have rejected these standing requirements. 37
While a complete discussion of all these principles and limitations is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it can be stated that courts look
upon civil RICO with disfavor. While the validity of many court
imposed restrictions is unclear, the limitation which can be most
easily justified is the denial of equitable relief to private litigants.

II.

DENYING EQUITABLE RELIEF

The question whether courts could grant equitable relief to private RICO litigants was surprisingly not addressed until 1981. The
first reported case in which a court was faced with this issue was
Vietnamese Fisherman's Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux
1982) (plaintiff must establish he has incurred a commercial injury, e.g.. some form of
business loss); North Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. I11.
1980) (plaintiff must establish he was competively injured).
33. Sedima SPRL v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, No. 84-648 (requiring plaintiff show a racketeering injury); Clute v. Davenport
Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1573 (D. Conn. 1984) (requiring racketeering injury); In re
Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Va. 1983) (requiring racketeering injury); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (requiring a
racketeering enterprise injury); Harper v. New Japan See., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (requiring a racketeering injury); Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb
Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring a
racketeering enterprise injury).
34. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
581 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Maryville Academy v. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Inc.,
530 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
35. The use of antitrust standing requirements is incorrect in light of RICO's legislative history. While RICO was partially modeled after antitrust law, RICO was purposely cast as a separate statute. This was done upon recommendation of the American
Bar Association commenting on two predecessors of RICO, S. 2048 and S. 2049. The
A.B.A. Antitrust Division, after examining these bills, recommended they be cast as a
separate statute so as to avoid the possibility that such strict standing requirements
would force "litigants to contend with a body of precedent appropriate [only] in a
purely antitrust context." Presumably, Congress expressed an intent to avoid these concepts by casting RICO as a separate statute. The American Bar Association's report is
reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 6994 (1969). For further discussion on this topic, see
Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of JudicialRestriction, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1101 (1982).
36. The term directly injured in relation to RICO means that the plaintiff has been
injured by the defendant's racketeering activity, rather than by the defendant's acts in
violation of section 1962.
37. For an excellent discussion of these concepts and the various approaches different jurisdictions have taken, see In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton and Co., 583 F. Supp.
1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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Klan.38 This case involved problems that arose in southern Texas
between local residents and Vietnamese refugees who had recently
settled in the area. 39 The Vietnamese Fisherman's Association
sought both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief4 0 against
the Klan for violation of section 1962 of RICO, 4 1 and various state
causes of action. The court, however, failed to even address the
issue whether it was authorized to grant equitable relief in a private
RICO action. The court merely denied the granting of preliminary
injunctive relief for failure to show a likelihood of success on the
43
merits. 42 Like the court in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAssociation,
other courts faced with the issue of equitable relief for private litigants applied the same approach. Some courts simply assumed equitable relief was available without discussion." These decisions
38. 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
39. Id. at 1001.
40. Specifically, the Vietnamese Fisherman's Association sought preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief to restrain the Klan from undertaking activities designed to
interfere with the Vietnamese fishermen. The Klan's activities included acts of violence
and intimidation, such as inciting local residents to engage in boat burning, armed boat
patrols, assaults, and the Klan's maintenance of paramilitary camps. Id. at 1000.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
42. 518 F. Supp. at 1014. The court held plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a
statute defined as racketeering activity in 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
43. 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
44. The court in Ashland Oil v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), implied
that the remedies found in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) are available to private litigants, but held
that the type of relief sought by the plaintiff (attachment) was not one of the available
remedies. Id. at 85. See also, USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy Inc., 539 F. Supp.
807 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (the court's opinion gives the impression that preliminary injunctive relief may be granted to private RICO litigant); but see USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982) (characterizing the issuance of the
preliminary injunction by the lower court as pursuant to a pendent state claim, not
pursuant to RICO). The court in Marshall Field & Co. v. Ichan, 537 F. Supp. 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), assumed equitable relief may be granted to private RICO litigants, but
denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction for failure to establish irreparable injury or to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court's opinion does
not make clear whether this power is found in RICO or from the court's inherent
power, most likely because the court did not see this as an issue.
The court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, No. 81 Civ. 2616, slip op.
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), actually granted equitable relief pursuant to a RICO cause of action.
The court, however, failed to give a rationale for where it felt the power to do so was
derived. However, during oral arguments Judge Pratt is quoted as stating, in response
to the plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, "I don't have that authority
under RICO. You read the statute wrong. The United States Attorney has that authority, but not as a private litigant. If I have the authority it's only because there is some
inherent authority to issue a preliminary injunction. Whether I told you when we first
had the argument about the motion or not, I do not see that you have any authority
under RICO for the relief you're seeking. If I have it it's under rule 65, I guess an
injunction." Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) [copy on file in the offices of California Western
Law Review].
Judge Pratt reaffirmed that the preliminary injunction was not granted pursuant to
authority found in § 1964(a) in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp.
908, 909 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) aff'd, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) but did note that "whether
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failed to make it clear whether such a right was found in the RICO
statute or was available through the courts inherent equitable
45
power.
The first case which recognized the issue whether section 196446
granted private litigants the right to seek equitable relief was the
landmark case of Bennett v. Berg.47 The plaintiffs in Bennett
brought a RICO action against a number of defendants, including
John Knox Retirement Village, of which they were residents. 48 The
plaintiffs claimed they faced a "loss of life care" that they would
have received but for fraud perpetrated by the defendants. 49 The
plaintiffs sought equitable relief against the village itself in the form
of reorganization pursuant to the remedies found in section 1964(a)
of RICO.50 The court expressed uncertainty on whether a private
RICO litigant could be granted this form of relief, either through
authorization of section 1964-1 or through the court's inherent equitable power. The court, however, found it unnecessary to answer
the "difficult" question whether section 1964 authorized private equitable relief.5 2 The court dismissed the count against the Village
on other grounds.5 3 Subsequently other courts which addressed the
issue began to express doubts on the availability of equitable relief
for a private RICO plaintiff.5 4 But, like the court in Bennett, these
courts found it unnecessary to make a ruling for other reasons.
a preliminary injunction is available to a private party under § 1964 appears at least to
be an open question." Id.
45. If the courts imply the power to grant private RICO litigants equitable relief,
this right would be subject to the traditional rules of granting such relief. Thus, to
obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff would have to show he is threatened by some injury
for which he has no adequate legal remedy, and there is a danger the act complained of
will actually occur, in other words, he will incur irreparable injury if the relief requested
is not granted. Temporary or preliminary injuctive relief would be subject to the requirements set out in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2941 (1973). On the other hand, if RICO is read
as an express grant of a right to equitable relief it is possible that neither of these prerequisites need be shown. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C § 1964 (1982).
47. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 1057.
49. 685 F.2d at 1064.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
51. Id.
52. 685 F.2d at 1064.
53. The court dismissed the count against John Knox Retirement Village for the
plaintiffs failure to establish a person distinct from the enterprise. Id. at 1064.
54. The court in Dan River, Inc. v. Ichan, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983), found that
section 1964 did not authorize equitable relief for private litigants. The court also expressed doubt that the right to equitable relief may be implied, but found it unnecessary
to examine this issue because the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the
merits. See also Trane Co. v. O'Conner Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd,
718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983). The lower court's opinion expresses doubt as to whether
equitable relief is available to private RICO litigants. The circuit court affirmed these
doubts, but found it unnecessary to make a holding on this issue.
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At present there have been only three reported cases in which
courts have expressly ruled on the availability of equitable remedies
to private civil RICO litigants. Most recently the court in Chambers Development Co. Inc. v. Browning-FerrisIndustries" ruled that
equitable relief was available to private RICO litigants. The court
did not make it clear whether such authority was found in section
196456 or through the court's inherent equitable powers. The court
in Chambers based its holding on a recent article arguing such relief
was expressly authorized 57 and other holdings seeming to imply
there is a right to equitable relief under the court's inherent
power.5 8 The distinction the court fails to deal with is whether the
drastic remedies set forth in section 1964(a) 59 should be made available to private litigants. 60 In another recent decision, DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp.,61 the court ruled that the forms of relief in
63
section 1964(a) 62 were not available to private RICO litigants.
The court did rule that the granting of equitable restitution 64 is permissible in a civil RICO cause of action. 65 The court's decision implies that the power to grant such relief may be found in the court's
inherent equitable power. 66 Even the validity of this holding is sublegislative history and current
ject to question in light of RICO's
67
rules of statutory construction.
Despite Chambers and DeMent, there is only one case to date
which a court went into detail on the issue of granting equitable
68
relief to private RICO litigants: Kaushal v. State Bank of India.
The court's holding in Kaushalmakes two significant points. First,
55. 590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
57. See Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations. Current
Problems in Federal Civil Practice, 1 PRAC. LAW INST. (1983).
58. The court notes that it is following Marshal Field & Co. v. Ichan, 537 F. Supp.

413 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Klu Klux
Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.Tex. 1981). However, these cases also fail to make it clear
where the authority to grant private party's equitable relief is derived from.
59. 18 U.S.C § 1964(a) (1982).
60. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
61. 589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
63. 589 F. Supp. at 1383. The court noted that while it was holding that the remedies found in section 1964(a) were not available to private RICO litigants, it was not
ruling on the availability of preliminary injunctive relief in extraordinary circumstances.

Id. at n.3.
64. Restitution in a legal sense is an equitable principle founded on the maxim that

he who seeks equity must do equity. One of the grounds on which the doctrine is based
is the prevention of unjust enrichment. 77 C.J.S. Restitution § 322 (1952).
65. DeMent, 589 F. Supp. at 1385.

66. Id.
67. See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
68. 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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section 196469 by its language does not grant private litigants the
right to seek equitable relief for violations of RICO. Second, the
courts should not make equitable relief available to private RICO
litigants based on their inherent power to grant equity.
A.

Kaushal v. State Bank of India 7°

The plaintiffs in Kaushal, Satya and Vinad Kaushal, and Raja
Enterprises, Inc. (Raja Companies), brought suit for violation of
RICO against the State Bank of India (S.B.I.), its officers and employees, and Patson Enterprises and its affiliates (Patson Companies). 71 Before 1981, S.B.I. and Patson Companies had engaged in
extensive business transactions. By late 1979, S.B.I. had over two
million dollars in loans outstanding to Patson Companies. Prior to
this time, two officers of S.B.I. had close personal and business associations with a principal shareholder of Patson Companies who
was personally liable on the S.B.I. loans.72 When the officers and
the principal shareholder became aware that Patson Companies was
unable to repay these loans, they devised a scheme to defraud the
plaintiffs. In effectuating this scheme, the defendants used the
United States mails numerous times in violation of the federal mail
74
fraud statute; 73 thus, also violating RICO.
The defendants, acting for S.B.I., Patson Companies, and themselves, presented the plaintiff with false financial statements that intentionally overstated the assets of Patson Companies and
understated its liabilities by more than $700,000. By doing so, the
defendants induced the plaintiffs to form Raja Companies and
purchase the assets and liabilities of Patson Companies. Further69. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
70. 556 F. Supp. 576. (N.D. Ill. 1983).
71. Id. at 577.

72. Id.

73. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-

fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
couterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes
or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
74. Note the actual violation of section 1962 of RICO is not the commission of
mail fraud, but the defendant's participation in an enterprise's (S.B.I.) affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity. See supra, note 20.
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more, the defendants, through use of the mails, induced the plaintiffs to personally secure Raja Companies' debts with their own
assets. 75 Also, as part of this scheme, the defendants planned to
seize Patson Companies' only solvent business, which became part
of Raja Companies. This portion of the scheme called for S.B.I. to
foreclose on this business when the plaintiffs discovered the fraud.
S.B.I. then planned to sell this business to one of its principal customers in New York. This portion of the scheme, which also involved numerous acts of mail fraud, had
not yet fully been
76
implemented at the time suit was brought.
The plaintiffs then brought suit for violation of RICO, seeking
treble damages, injunctive relief in the form of blocking S.B.I.'s sale
of the solvent business, and divestiture of any interest S.B.I. had in
Raja Companies. The court found that the plaintiffs had successfully stated a RICO cause of action for violation of section
1962(c). 77 The court then proceeded to examine the plaintiffs request for injunctive relief and divestiture. The court's ruling makes
it clear that equitable relief is not available to private litigants in a
RICO cause of action.
B.

RICO's Language Denies Private Litigants Equitable Relief

The court in Kausha178 dismissed the argument that RICO authorized the granting of equitable relief to private litigants. 79 The
court did so despite the contention of a number of recent authors
who assert that equitable relief is expressly authorized.80 A close
analysis of the language of section 196481 supports this conclusion. 82 Section 1964(a) 83 grants the United States district courts ju75. 556 F. Supp. at 578.
76. Id.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
78. 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983).

79. Id. at 584.
80. See Strafer, Massumi & Skelnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: Everybody's Darling, 19 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influ-

enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): Basic Concepts Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980) (Blakey & Gettings); Blakey, The RICO Civil
FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237
(1982). See also, Note, The Availability of EquitableRelief in Civil Causes of Action in
RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945 (1984) and Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age:
Some Maturational Problems and Proposalsfor Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285
(1983).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
82. The starting point in statutory construction is always the language of the statute itself. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
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risdiction to issue orders to prevent and restrain violations of
RICO. 84 This power includes, but is not limited to, orders of divestiture of any illegally obtained interest in an enterprise, the issuance of restraining orders and dissolution and reorganization of any
enterprise. 85 While expressly authorizing jurisdiction to grant equitable relief, this section does not say who may invoke the court's
power. 86 However, this section gives the courts the power to grant
a number of equitable remedies, which in the antitrust context are
only available to the government.87 These remedies, if made available to private litigants, could become a dangerous tool against the
legitimate business community if they are abused by unscrupulous
competitors. While Congress did recognize that RICO had the potential to be used against legitimate business, this was not the purpose for RICO's creation. 88 In fact, to expand RICO in this
manner could defeat Congress' intent. 89 Section 1964(b) 90 grants
the Attorney General the power to institute civil proceedings
against violators of RICO. This section allows the Attorney General to obtain preliminary equitable relief and those other forms of
equitable relief found in section 1964(a). 91 While this section places
a potentially significant tool to fight organized crime in the hands of
the government, it has, surprisingly, been rarely used.92 The advanany interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582.
87. See Bosse v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1977)
(divestiture not an available remedy to private litigants under 15 U.S.C. § 26); Calnetics
v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 692 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976) (divestiture not available to private litigants in antitrust suits); and International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975)
(divestiture and dissolution not available to private litigants in antitrust law.) See infra
notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 115 for RICO'S statement of purpose.
89. See infra note 117.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) provides:
The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed
as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final
determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders
or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
92. As of this writing this author is aware of only four cases in which the Attorney
General has used civil proceedings to obtain injunctive penalties for violation of RICO.
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
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tages of this statutory grant of equitable relief to the government are
substantial. One court 93 ruled that, to obtain equitable relief, the
to establish irreparable harm or inadegovernment does not have
94
quacy of remedy at law.
Section 1964(c) 95 creates a cause of action for private litigants
who have been injured by reason of a RICO violation. 96 This section expressly provides for recovery of treble damages and reasonable attorneys fees. 97 This section, unlike section 1964(b), 98 does
not refer to any other portion of section 1964. 99 It does not, by its
terms, confer a right to equitable relief on private litigants.10 0 Had
Congress intended to confer such a right on private litigants they
would have referred to section 1964(a),10 1 however, they failed to
do so despite the wishes of certain congressmen.102 This fact alone
is substantial evidence that RICO does not grant private RICO litigants a right to equitable relief.10 3 The counter argument, however,
is that because Congress did not expressly limit the right to seek
1984); United States v. Ladmar, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); and United States
v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
93. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
94. Id. at 1858-59. The court held that it was Congress's intent in adopting § 1964
to provide equitable relief for the government for violations of § 1962. Moreover, there
need be no showing of irreparable harm to obtain injunctive relief other than an injury
to the public. The court also decided not to require a showing of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law because, due to the existence of the criminal remedy under § 1963, such a
requirement would defeat a government action under § 1964. Id.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
96. Id.
97. Id. It should be noted that if Congress had failed to explicitly provide for
treble damages, plaintiffs would have been limited to recovery of ordinary damages.
Treble damages are not available unless there is an express statutory grant. See 22 AM.
JUR. 2D Damages § 267 (1965).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
99. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Section 1964(b) states
the Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. This wording is
significant in light of RICO's legislative history, because at the time section 1964 was
drafted by the Senate, it did not contain a private cause of action. While this makes it
clear the Attorney General is authorized to obtain the forms of relief found in section
1964(a), it also makes it clear that section 1964(a) was not drafted with private litigants
in mind. Furthermore, section 1964(c) does not refer to any other portion of section
1964, thus indicating Congress did not intend for private litigants to be granted the
remedies found in section 1964(a).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
102. Congressman Stieger during House debates did propose an amendment granting private litigants equitable relief, but this proposal was rejected. See infra note 154
and accompanying text.
103. As stated by the Supreme Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979): "Obviously when Congress wished to provide a private. ..
remedy it knew how to do so, and did so expressly." Id. at 21. Had Congress wished
that there be equitable relief for private litigants, they would have expressly provided so.
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equitable relief to the Attorney General in subsection (b) 104 and

chose the wording "sue and shall recover" in subsection (c),10 5 Congress intended to grant private litigants the remedies found in sec10 6
tion 1964(a).
The court in Kaushal 0 7 summarily rejected this argument, finding such a reading "bizarre and wholly unconvincing as a matter of
plain English." 10 8 Although the statutory language of RICO is arguably ambiguous, the Kaushal court refused to read into it an as-

sertable claim to equitable relief for private litigants.109
Nevertheless, the arguable ambiguity of section 1964(c) could
lend itself to the opposite conclusion. 110 The argument remains
that even if the courts find section 1964(c) ambiguous, they should
still construe the statute to expressly grant private litigants equitable relief."' Since Congress specifically expressed an intent that
RICO should be liberally construed,"12 the courts should read section 1964 to grant equitable remedies to private litigants. 113 This
argument is based on the contention that to so construe section
196414 would further RICO's purpose. 1 5 However, to construe
RICO in this manner would not in reality further RICO's goals.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
107.
108.
109.
110.

556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Il.1983).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).

111. Id.
112. Section 904 of title IX of Public Law 91-452 provided that: "(a) The provisions
of this title [enacting this chapter and amending sections 1505, 2516, and 2517 of this
title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).

114. Id.
115. Section 1 of Public Law 91-452 provided in part that:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its
power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated
gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation
and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of
social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate
and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt
our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States
weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors
and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process
of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
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RICO's provision for treble damages alone is sufficient, and possibly the best, remedy to grant private litigants to fight organized
crime. Such a remedy is much simpler to enforce and has the greatest effect on organized crime. In contrast, the equitable remedies in
section 1964(a) 1 6 are difficult to enforce and present a greater danger to legitimate business rather than aiding in the fight against organized crime 117 Furthermore, liberal construction does not give
the courts a free hand. The fact that a statute is to be liberally
construed does not grant the courts the power to read into it something Congress did not intend.' 18 The courts cannot just ignore the
intent of Congress." l9 The legislative history of RICO indicates
that Congress did not intend to grant private litigants the12right
to
0
seek the forms of equitable relief found in section 1964(a).
C. Equitable Remedies for Private Litigants: RICO's Legislative
History
The legislative history of RICO supports the conclusion that
Congress did not intend for RICO to grant private litigants equitable relief. This conclusion holds true for the arguments that equitable relief is expressly authorized and such authorization may be
implied from a court's inherent equitable power.
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title note above] to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
117. The legislative history clearly indicates RICO's purpose is not to aid organized
crime but to rid legitimate business of organized crime. Yet just such a result could
occur if the equitable remedies found in § 1964(a) are made available to private litigants. Organized crime's propensity for taking over or controlling legitimate business
has been well documented. If private litigants were given such remedies as divestiture,
dissolution or reorganization there is the potential that organized crime, in the guise of
legitimate business, will use these remedies to rid itself of competition. A result which is
contrary to the purpose behind RICO. For some excellent examples of how organized
crime infiltrates legitimate business See H. ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME (1981) and
J. KWITNY, VICIOUS CIRCLES: MAFIA IN THE MARKETPLACE (1979).
118. Liberal construction does not provide the courts the power to put into the law
what the legislature never intended to be there. Nor does liberal construction allow the
courts to give words forced meaning or expand or enlarge a statute beyond congressional intent. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 273 (1965). See also Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). "The ultimate question is one of congressional intent,
not whether the court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress
enacted into law." Id. at 578.
119. See Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union
AFL CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). "Whenever the court determines the scope of
rights and remedies under a federal statute, the critical factor is the congressional intent
behind the particular provision at issue." Id. at 22.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
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RICO was enacted as Title IX of The Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,121 which was originally introduced as Senate Bill 30 (S.
30).122 The beginnings of RICO can be found in two bills introduced prior to the introduction of S. 30. In 1967, Senator Hruska
from Nebraska had introduced two bills similar in nature to RICO,
Senate Bill 2048 (S. 2048) and Senate Bill 2049 (S. 2049).123 These
bills were introduced in response to the recent report of the President's Crime Commission, and presented novel concepts for fighting organized crime.124 Senate Bill 2048 suggested that an
amendment be made to antitrust laws making it a violation of antitrust law to use unreported income derived from one line of business in another line of business. 125 Senate Bill 2049 was very similar
to RICO. This bill, like RICO, would have made it a crime to invest income derived from specified criminal activities into any legitimate business. 126 Most significantly, this bill expressly provided for
treble damages and injunctive relief for private litigants. 127 The
bills, however, were withdrawn at the suggestion of the American
Bar Association, which approved of the concept but noted certain
128
inherent problems which could have affected their use.
Subsequently, in January 1969, Senator McClellan introduced S.
30, The Organized Crime Control Act. 12 9 At this time, however, S.
30 did not contain a RICO type provision, but did provide a
number of other provisions to fight organized crime.1 30 In March
1969, Senator Hruska introduced Senate Bill 1623 (S. 1623), a bill
which was modeled after S. 2048 and S. 2049. Senate Bill 1623,
entitled the Criminal Activities Profits Act, represented a synthesis
of S. 2049 and similar bills introduced by Congressman Poff in the
House.1 3' Senate Bill 1623, like S. 2049 and other bills introduced
121. Pub. L. 91-452, § 901(a) 84 Stat. 941.
122. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
123. 113 CONG. REC. S17,997 (1967).
124. At the introduction of these bills Senator Hruska quoted a comment in the
President's Crime Commission report which noted, "Law enforcement's way of fighting
organized crime has been primitive compared to organized crime's way of operating.
Law enforcement must use methods at least as efficient as organized crime's." The bills
introduced suggested use of antitrust law are best suited to accomplish this. 113 CONG.
REC. S. 17,799 (1967).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The ABA report is reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. S. 6994 (1969). See supra note
35. For the reasons behind the bills suggested rejection by the A.B.A.
129. 115 CONG. REC. S769 (1969).
130. Other provisions included special grand juries, immunity for witnesses, provisions for false declarations before a grand jury, provisions for protective housing for
witnesses, special rule relating to evidence, special offender sentencing. 115 CONG.
REC. S5873-82 (1969).
131. 115 CONG. REC. 56992 (1969).
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in the House by Congressman Poff, 13 2 provided expressly for treble
damages and equitable relief for private litigants 1 33 No action,
however, was taken on this bill.
Finally, in April 1969, Senators McClellan and Hruska introduced S. 1861, The Corrupt Organizations Act,1 34 the provisions of
which were described as bipartisan legislation. 135 Unlike the previous bills, S. 1861 did not contain a private cause of action. 136 Senate bill 1861 provided for only criminal sanctions and civil actions
at the instigation of the government.1 37 Senator McClellan, commenting on the bill at its introduction, did note that equitable remedies provided could be a valuable tool, and that ample precedent for
their use by the government existed in the antitrust laws.' 3 8 The
Senator also made a point of noting that the equitable remedies
listed were not exclusive, and "the ability of our chancery courts to
formulate remedies to fit the wrong is one of the great benefits of
our system."' 139 The Senator did not speak to the use of these remedies by private litigants, nor did he in any way suggest this could be
done. In December 1969, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.30 amended to include S.1861 as title IX was presented
to the Senate by Senator McClellan. 40 The report for the most part
consisted of similar language to that used by Senator McClellan in
the past.' 4 The Committee's report describes title IX as providing
for civil provisions to dislodge the racketeers from legitimate business through an approach of equitable relief broad enough to do
"all that is necessary" to free the channels of commerce from illicit
activity.' 42 Title IX, however, as reported did not contain a private
cause of action.' 43 Subsequently S.30 was passed by the Senate in
132. See infra note 147.

133. 115
only to
section
134.
135.

CONG.

REC. S6995 (1969). This bill would have granted injunctive relief

private litigants. There is no mention of granting the drastic remedies found in
1964(a) to private litigants.
115 CONG. REC. S9566 (1969).
115 CONG. REC. S9567 (1969). In commenting on the introduction of this bill,

Senator McClellan noted that he had been in contact with Congressman Poff in reference to this bill.

136. Id. at 9569.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 9567.

139. Id.
140. S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

141. Id. On the subject of equitable remedies, the committee's report repeats the
language of Senator McClellan at the introduction of S. 1861. The committee again
notes the remedies listed in section 1964(a) are not exclusive, but no mention is made of
the fact that S.1861 lacks a private cause of action, nor is there any suggestion one
should be included.
142. Id. at 79. The significance in this language is the fact that S.1861 did not
contain a private cause of action, yet the committee expressed the opinion that the statute already provided "all that is necessary."
143. Id. No explanation is ever given for why a private cause of action was not
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January 1970.144
Senate Bill 30 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary in January 1970,145 and was favorably reported on by that
committee in September 1970.146 However, the bill as reported by
the House Committee now contained a private cause of action for

treble damages.147 While the committee's description of this provision does not state that the treble damages remedy is exclusive, no
reference is made in this description to equitable relief. 148 Little on
section 1964(c) 149 was said when the bill was brought up for House

consideration, but it was noted that at the suggestion of Congressman Stieger of Arizona and the American Bar Association the committee had provided the private treble damages provision. 150 Again,
no mention was made of equitable relief for private litigants, but it

was noted that antitrust sanctions of a civil nature were provided.

51

Surprisingly, this private cause of action received very little discus-

sion in later House debates on S. 30, although some amendments of
included in S. 1861. However, Professor Blakey notes that Senator McClellan later
indicated that the lack of a private cause of action was not because of opposition to it,
but because detailed consideration was not given to carrying out the antitrust parallel.
Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Relflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 262 n.70 (1983).
144. 116 CONG. REC. S. 972 (1970).
145. 116 CONG. REc. S. 1103 (1970).
146. H. R. Rep. No. 1549 91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4007-91.

147. While the committee report does not make it clear where section 1964(c) came
from it may fairly be assumed this section was adopted upon the suggestion of the ABA
and Congressman Stieger, the ABA in its report to the House Subcommittee on S. 30
recommended Title IX be amended to include a private damage action based on § 15 of
the Clayton Act. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcommittee 5 of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 91st Cong. 2d 544
(1970). Congressman Stieger, in a letter to Congressman Celler relating to his proposed
amendment, stated that "businessman. . . wronged by organized crime, should at least
be given a legal remedy." Id. at 520. The court in Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., Inc.,
741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted,53 U.S.L.W. No. 84-648 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985)
notes that the statutory language was drawn from H.R. 19586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56
(1970), one of two House bills introduced at the same time as S. 30 by Congressman
Poff. Professor Blakey notes in a recent article that the other bill, H.R. 19215, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. H31914 (1970), unlike H.R. 19586, expressly provided
for injunctive relief for private parties. He further notes that it was "unfortunate" that
H.R. 19215 was not used. Blakey & Gettings supra note 80, at 1020 n.63.
The court in Sedima notes that by doing so the House "explicitly" rejected the idea of
private injunctive relief. 741 F.2d at 489 n.20.
148. The committee's report in its description of section 1964(c) makes no reference
to private litigants receiving any form of equitable relief, including the remedies found
in section 1964(a). The report describes section 1964(c) as only providing for the recovery of treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees. H.R. Rep. No. 1549 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4034.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
150. 116 CONG. REC. H35295 (1970).

151. Congressman Poff noted that Title IX represented an adaptation of the machinery used in the antitrust field to redress violations of the Sherman Act and other
antitrust legislation, thus sustaining the analogy of antitrust law to RICO. Id. at 35295.
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title IX were proposed. 152
One noteworthy amendment was proposed by Congressman
Stieger. He submitted an amendment to section 1964153 which
would have expressly granted the ability to institute equitable proceedings to private litigants.1 54 In commenting on this amendment,
Congressman Poff noted that it "offered additional civil remediesbut prudence would dictate that the Judiciary Committee very carefully explore the potential consequences that this new remedy might
55 Conhave and all the ramifications this legislation contains."115
6 most
bill,
the
of
manager
a
considered
gressman Poff, who is
likely would not have made such a comment if the statute as it
stood already granted equitable relief to private litigants. Furthermore, considering the Congressman's reservations on such a proposal furthers the argument that the authority to grant equitable
remedies to private RICO litigants should not be implied by the
courts. Upon the recommendation of Congressman Poff, Congressman Stieger withdrew his amendment,1 57 and the bill was passed 1by
58
the House without any further discussion of equitable relief.
Subsequently, when the Senate considered the bill as amended by
152. Congressman Mikva suggested that RICO should be amended to provide that
any person who brings a frivolous suit would be subject to treble damages. In retrospect
such an amendment may have been wise considering the glut of recent RICO actions.
Another amendment proposed by Congressman Biaggi would have explicitly made it
a crime to be a member of La Cosa Nostra or the Mafia. However, this amendment was
rejected because of constitutional considerations. 116 CONG. REC. H35342-35346
(1970).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
154. The amendment proposed by Congressman Stieger provided in part:
(c) Any person may institute proceedings under subsection (a) of this section, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles which govern the
granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other cases.
Upon the execution of a proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of irreparable loss or damage a preliminary
injunction may be issued in any action before a determination thereof upon its
merits.
116 CONG. REC. H35346 (1970).
155. Id.
156. While ordinarily the opinions of individual members of Congress are not considered to be adept at determining congressional intent, Congressman Poff has been
recognized as a "manager" of the bill by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1980). As such, his statement must be afforded some
weight in determining congressional intent. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63
(1980). See also Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg. 58 NOTRE DAME LAW 237, 271 n.105 (1982).
157. 116 CONG. REC. H35347 (1970). Congressman Stieger expresed concern that
the issue of equitable relief for private litigants should be taken up at another time. Id.
Subsequently, in 1971, such an amendment was proposed in the Senate to complete
the antitrust analogy, but no action was taken on it. 117 CONG. REc. S46386 (1971).
While post enactment history is not always of significance, it may show Congress'
awareness of a limitation or problem, and if not changed, an intent to see fit not to do
so. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530-35, (1982).
158. 116 CONG. REC. H35,364 (1970).
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the House, 159 Senator McClellan noted that only "minor" changes
had been made. Senator Hruska also noted the changes were "not
of major significance."' 160 There was no discussion of the new private cause of action inserted by the House, nor any thoughts on its
possible repercussions. The bill was passed by the Senate as
amended by the House and was signed into law in October 1970.16
Therefore, as the court in Kaushal162 noted, while RICO's legislative history is far from precise, it strongly indicates Congress did
not intend to grant private litigants equitable remedies. 163 First, the
legislative history of RICO in the Senate indicates that the Senate
did not intend, when drafting section 1964(a), 164 that these remedies should be made available to private litigants. The strongest
evidence of this is the fact that as originally passed in the Senate,
section 1964165 did not contain a private cause of action. The
Kaushal court, in examining RICO's legislative history, came to the
conclusion that section 1964(a)166 is wholly separate from section
1964(c) 167 and any discussion of section 1964(a) in the Senate bears
16
little weight on the issue of equitable relief for private litigants. 8
169
The history of RICO in the House is more significant.
The discussion of the amendment introduced by Congressman Stieger 170 is
strong evidence that, as enacted, section 1964171 does not provide
for equitable relief for private litigants, nor should the courts imply
a right to equitable relief.
D.

The Antitrust Analogy

An analogy of antitrust laws to RICO furthers support for the
denial of equitable relief for private litigants.172 In a similar situa159. The House version contained a number of amendments including the private
cause of action in title IX and two new titles one dealing with bombings and explosives
and another setting up a commission on individual rights, 116 CONG. REC. 536,293

(1969).
160.
161.
162.
163.

116 CONG. REC. S36,293 (1970).
116 CONG. REC. S37,264 (1970).
556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Id. at 583.

164. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
168. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 583.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
172. The legislative history of RICO establishes a clear intent to analogize RICO
with antitrust law, even though RICO was cast as a separate statute to avoid standing
problems. The court in Kaushal notes the general analogy to antitrust was clearly behind much of Congress' thinking in enacting the civil RICO provisions. Kaushal, 556
F. Supp. at 583.
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tion, the Supreme Court determined that section 7 of the Sherman
Act, 173 which was almost identical to section 1964(c) 174 of RICO,
did not grant private litigants equitable relief. 175 Considering the
numerous references to antitrust law as precedent for RICO's equitable remedies, 76 Congress seemingly was aware of the possibility
of a similar ruling; yet, Congress failed to act to prevent this. It
may therefore be inferred that this failure to act implies that Congress did not intend to grant private RICO litigants equitable remedies. Furthermore, the Clayton Act, unlike RICO, expressly
provides for equitable relief for private litigants.' 77 The court in
Kaushal 78 noted that, had Congress intended to do so, they would
have completed the analogy of private RICO actions to the antitrust
laws by expressly including a private equitable remedy. 7 9 Instead
Congress chose not to do so. This congressional silence leads to the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to grant private litigants
equitable relief.
173. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), provided:
§ 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be
unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him
sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
175. See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917); Minnesota v. Northern
Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904).
176. See supra note 140.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections two, three, seven and eight of this act [15 USCS
§§ 13, 14, 18 and 19], when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and
upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief
against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate
commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven [49
USCS § 1 et seq.] in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
178. 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
179. Id. at 583. The court also notes that in U.S.C. section 15 the private antitrust
remedy of the Clayton Act contains the same "and shall recover" language that arguably implies a right to equitable relief. The court notes that those authors who make this
argument would regard Congress' enactment of 15 U.S.C. section 26 "redundant or an
example of poor draftsmanship." Id. at n.22.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984

21

California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 2, Art. 9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 21

E.

Implying the Right to Equitable Relief in RICO

The question whether the courts, through their inherent equitable
power, should imply the right of equitable relief for private litigants,
while of less importance than whether RICO expressly grants equitable remedies, is still an issue which faces the courts. 180 Recently
in DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp.,181 the court ruled that a court
could grant equitable remedies through their inherent power, 182 but
that the injunctive forms of relief found in section 1964(a) were not
available to private litigants. 183 As previously stated, even this ruling is subject to question in light of RICO's legislative history and
rules of statutory construction.18 4 The court in Kaushal185 noted
that current Supreme Court doctrine severely limits both the implication of a cause of action 8 6 or additional remedies where a statute
87
fails to expressly provide for them.
Ordinarily when a statute provides for a "general right to sue,"
federal courts may use any available remedy to provide the plaintiff
with redress.' 88 However, this is not so, when a statute expressly
provides the remedy that is available to a litigant. When a statute
creates a cause of action for a private party and provides for a particular remedy, the courts are reluctant to imply additional remedies.' 8 9 It is clear that RICO provides more to private litigants than
a general right to sue. Section 1964(c)190 grants private litigants not
only a cause of action, but also expressly provides the available rem180. This issue is of less importance because conceivably the courts would be less
likely to issue the drastic remedies found in section 1964(a) without explicit statutory
approval. See, Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582 wherein the court stated that even if the
right to equitable remedies could be implied, those implied remedies would not necessarily include those found in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
181. 589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
182. Id. at 1385.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
184. See supra notes 121 through 171 and accompanying text.
185. 556 F. Supp. at 576 (N.D. I11.1983).
186. While there is no question that, in its present form, section 1964 grants private
litigants a cause of action for violation of RICO, the question may have arisen but for
the House amendment. Professor Blakey argues that even if this had not been done a
private cuase of action would have been implied under the rules set forth in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). However, considering the strict stance the Supreme Court has
taken recently in implying causes of action, even this result is questionable. See Blakey,
The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 237 n.71 (1982).
187. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 584.
188. Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678 (1946).
189. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979):
"where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies the courts must be
chary of reading others into it," id. at 19; United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328
(1919): "where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is
exclusive," id. at 331.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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edy.' 9 1 However, the courts may still imply additional remedies in
some situations. Recent Supreme Court rulings1 92 hold that for a
court to imply additional remedies in this type of statute, there must
be persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend the remedy
granted to be exclusive. 193 In this case the problem is the legislative
194
history presents persuasive evidence of the opposite conclusion.
The result, therefore, must be that the right to equitable remedies
for private RICO litigants should not be implied.
CONCLUSION

At the present time, the courts should not make equitable relief
available to private RICO litigants. While the language of RICO
supports such a conclusion in itself, neither the language nor the
legislative history make it clear that equitable relief for private
RICO litigants was ever intended. The history of RICO clearly establishes that Congress was aware of the possibility of granting private litigants equitable relief. As shown, a number of prior bills and
amendments suggesting the use of equitable relief were proposed to
Congress. Yet Congress chose not to adopt these proposals.
Rather, Congress chose a remedial scheme, which by its own terms
grants only treble damages for a cause of action. Moreover, a comparison of RICO to similarly worded antitrust law indicates that
Congress did not intend to provide equitable remedies for private
litigants. Finally, this Comment has demonstrated that since the
RICO statute expressly provides for a remedy, it would be improper
for courts to imply equitable remedies under the statute. Until Congress chooses to make equitable relief available to private RICO litigants and expressly provides so, such relief should not be granted
absent another federal claim or a pendent state claim upon which
equitable relief may be granted. 195 Considering the broad scope of
RICO's predicate acts, it seems likely that most private litigants will
have such a claim.' 9 6 If Congress considers amending RICO to
191. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(e) with 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). The statute the
Supreme Court was confronted with in Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969)-42 U.S.C. § 1982-provides, "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Section
1982 provides a general right to sue, as it does not state the remedy to be made available. RICO, on the other hand, expressly provides for treble damages in section 1964(c)
and therefore provides more than a general right to sue.
192. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
193. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 584.

194. See supra notes 121-61 and accompanying text.
195. Pendent jurisdiction of state claims is authorized in certain situations under the
rule set out in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
196. Considering the broad scope of RICO's predicate acts, this would not be an
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provide a private litigant with the right to equitable relief, the consequences of possible abuse of the statute should be carefully
considered.
Stephen F Lopez*

unlikely result. Racketeering activity as defined by § 1961 covers a broad range of
crimes which are actionable in state and federal courts on ground other than RICO,
including fraud, bribery and other causes of action. See supra note 19.
In addition a number of states have recently enacted statutes similar in nature to
RICO could possibly be read to grant private litigants equitable relief when injured by
racketeering. However, it should be noted that a number of these statutes like RICO
are ambiguous on this issue, in that language similar to that found in § 1964 has been
used. Like RICO any final determination would be dependent on the legislative history
of the statute. See, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1817-101 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-393 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.01 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 1614-1 (Supp. 1982); HAWAI REV.
STAT. § 842-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-7801 (Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 56 1/
2, § 1651 (Smith-H Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West. Supp. 1984); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15: 1351-56 (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.350
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 41-1 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-1 (Supp.
1980); N.D. CERT. CODE § 12. 1-06.1 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 166-715 (1981);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-1 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1601 (Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82. 100 (Supp. 1984) (effective July 1, 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 946-80 (West Supp. 1984).
* The author wishes to thank Beth Chaney for her help and cooperation.
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